Cooperation is the default between the vast majority of people. Only a very few resort to violence. That vast majority getting together and contractually agreeing to protect eachother from those violent few would not be a case of coersion, but consentual agreement. These things certainly can be done on a large scale. Elections are proof of this (putting aside the effectiveness of representation systems in the modern age).
"Government: The body with the power to make and/or enforce laws to control a country, land area, people or organization."
Governments are needed to enforce laws. Laws exist to solve game-theoretical problems.
> This is not correct. You should try reading some David Friedman sometime.
It *is* correct. You just don't want to believe it, and neither does David Friedman. If you disagree, then you are obligated to study some game theory and explain why the game-theoretical reasoning is wrong. I will suggest "Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction" by Ken Binmore.
> Cooperation is the default between the vast majority of people.
That's in the context of a society where government punishes people who defect (theft, murder, rape, vandalism, etc) instead of cooperating. Of course most people are going to cooperate with others when a government will punish and imprison people if they don't.
It's not possible for people to cooperate on a large-scale without a government. There's no evidence that it would ever work.
> That vast majority getting together and contractually agreeing to protect each other from those violent few would not be a case of coercion, but consensual agreement.
> These things certainly can be done on a large scale.
No, they can't. Game theory proves otherwise.
> Elections are proof of this.
No, they aren't. Once again, elections exist within the context of a government that will punish people who reject the election results and want to overthrow the elected government. Elections also have the capacity to be rigged.
I don't generally advocate for a completely government free society, but I've been convinced that there are consensual structures that would likely work better than our current coercive structures for even things like national defense.
I generally advocate limited government - minarchy, with some structures to solve the largest free rider problems and resolving disputes.
Even in a government-less society, I do believe there need to be government-like structures that resolve free rider problems. For things where there are significant free rider affects in an area, one consensual solution is to have agreement to pay for defense a requirement to move into the defended area. This is government-like in that your choices are to pay for defense or to move somewhere else (and there may not be anywhere to move to without such a requirement). It may be feasible to resolve most of these free rider affects in a localized and decentralized way that allows practical choice, eg by doing this at the level of city or county, and then making confederate agreements among those cities or counties. I'm certainly willing to admit that large inland areas may still get substantial free rider benefits and refuse to pay for it. But it seems possible such free rider benefits might not be significant enough to warrant the force.
> I will suggest "Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction" by Ken Binmore.
I don't have time to spend hours reading the book recommendations of strangers, but I'm happy to discuss with you if you want to bring up points you think are most useful.
> No, they can't. Game theory proves otherwise.
How does game theory prove this? I do agree with you that free rider problems are significant. However, I think a flaw in much of your writing on libertarianism (based on what little of it I've read) is that it is a one sided attack that does not reference the desirability or efficacy of government solutions, but instead simply assumes their worth. I think its important to compare two alternatives, simply listing pros and cons of one alternative is not sufficient to make a choice unless put in reference to another alternative evaluated in the same way.
I agree that simple self-protection is clearly not an adequate defense. However, in a stateless society, you would not simply have voluntary armies, but you would have paid armies that are compensated based on their results, and so would have more incentive to follow through with their promises of defense.
However, there is of course the possibility that a war is lethal enough that no reasonable amount of money would persuade most people to fight. In such a case, as you suggest, a contractual agreement to fight if the need arises with contractual punishments for defectors might be necessary. David Friedman talks about that somewhere. There is a substantial difference between conscription, however, and a contractual obligation. One is entered into voluntarily and the other is not.
The problem with conscription over a voluntary contractual agreement is that its an easy way to exploit the populace. Rather than paying people an amount they would think is fair for the risk and work of having military obligations, they can pay people a much smaller amount and have worse conditions. There is no societal benefit to that. It would be more economically efficient to pay people an amount they find fair. During peace time, it seems far less likely that conscription would be a reasonable thing to have in comparison to fair compensation on a voluntary basis. But during wartime when the threat of death is imminent and not just theoretical, conscription seems much more likely to be appropriate.
I don't think its fair to characterize ancaps as generally saying polycentric law would "not fail". Its far more accurate to say they think it would likely succeed. There's a big difference there. One is an absolute and another is a tendency. There are few absolutes in this world.
I see you have a section on Georgism. Have you read my latest article on the land value tax?
You cover a lot of interesting topics in your write up on Libertarianism. I'll have to read more of it at some point.
> I think a flaw in much of your writing on libertarianism is that it is a one sided attack that does not reference the desirability or efficacy of government solutions, but instead simply assumes their worth.
The essay doesn't assume the value of government. The essay is about explaining why voluntary / consensual alternatives to government don't work. If consensual policies don't work, then government is necessary.
It's not one-sided either. I was an Ancap/Voluntaryist for almost 2 years, and a Libertarian for 4 years total. I use blockquote tags for addressing lots of pro-Libertarian objections throughout the essay, and there's even a section where I list what I do agree with Libertarians on: https://zerocontradictions.net/civilization/case-against-libertarianism#middle-ground
> How does game theory prove this?
The first essay that I linked explains this. From what you've written, it seems that you already implicitly understand why voluntary self-protection won't work when the circumstances are dire enough. You raise some good counter-arguments for less dire circumstances, and those will be addressed the next time the page is updated.
> Have you read my latest article on the land value tax?
Yes I have, and I'm glad we agree on that. My website also has multiple webpages about Georgism too:
What I mean is that its not framed as a comparison between government solutions and voluntary solutions. I would like to see those comparisons in such a write up.
I believe game theory proves that some government structures solve game theoretic problems. I don't see how it proves that there aren't other solutions to those problems. However, I do agree that any solution would require the ability to compel cooperation, but I believe that compulsion may be voluntarily agreed to in advance.
I came to one of the same conclusions about why Georgism lost popularity - the rise of the automobile made far more land accessible to people. This only lasted maybe 30 years however, before that land and the roads connecting them was used up. One reason I conjecture that you didn't mention is that WWII made the US massively wealthy and that lead to people forgetting the hard times (and Henry George). Since George was from the US, this probably helped kill the movement.
I don't see why I would write a comparison between government solutions and "voluntary" solutions. It's pretty straight-forward when one should be used instead of the other. "Voluntary" solutions work when there are no game-theoretic problems that must be solved, and government solutions are better when there are game-theoretic problems to be solved.
Perhaps I could elaborate more on my Middle Ground section where I talk about why I agree with Libertarians on some issues, but I feel that I've already written about my stance on those issues (or at least linked to people who talk about them) on my website.
From your perspective, I can see why you would favor having such a comparison, but I don't really care much about making everything "voluntary" when possible. I'm better described as a "whatever-works-ist" kind of person.
> I believe game theory proves that some government structures solve game theoretic problems. I don't see how it proves that there aren't other solutions to those problems.
If they are truly game-theoretic problems, then they would ultimately have to involve government intervention in some way. Most game theory problems (namely prisoner's dilemmas and tragedies of the commons) are distinguished by how they require force in order to be resolved. The exception is when government creates game-theoretic problems (e.g. welfare is a free-rider problem). But there are still free-rider problems that must be resolved by government force (e.g. protection, overpopulation, etc).
> WWII made the US massively wealthy and that lead to people forgetting the hard times (and Henry George). Since George was from the US, this probably helped kill the movement.
It's interesting that you bring that up. Perhaps I'll add that to the essay. I suppose a related reason could be how the cultural revolution during the 60s promoted many memes that aren't related to Georgism in any way. There's a limited number of memes that every person can promote since people have limited time and selective attention.
The goal of government is to solve game-theoretical problems in real-life: https://thewaywardaxolotl.blogspot.com/2014/07/game-theory-and-society.html
Yes. Depending on your definition of "government", a government may not be necessary or optimal to solve game-theoretical problems.
> To create cooperation on a large scale, it must be imposed on individuals by coercion.
This is not correct. You should try reading some David Friedman sometime: http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Law_as_a_private_good/Law_as_a_private_good.html
Cooperation is the default between the vast majority of people. Only a very few resort to violence. That vast majority getting together and contractually agreeing to protect eachother from those violent few would not be a case of coersion, but consentual agreement. These things certainly can be done on a large scale. Elections are proof of this (putting aside the effectiveness of representation systems in the modern age).
From Wiktionary.org: https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/government#English
"Government: The body with the power to make and/or enforce laws to control a country, land area, people or organization."
Governments are needed to enforce laws. Laws exist to solve game-theoretical problems.
> This is not correct. You should try reading some David Friedman sometime.
It *is* correct. You just don't want to believe it, and neither does David Friedman. If you disagree, then you are obligated to study some game theory and explain why the game-theoretical reasoning is wrong. I will suggest "Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction" by Ken Binmore.
> Cooperation is the default between the vast majority of people.
That's in the context of a society where government punishes people who defect (theft, murder, rape, vandalism, etc) instead of cooperating. Of course most people are going to cooperate with others when a government will punish and imprison people if they don't.
It's not possible for people to cooperate on a large-scale without a government. There's no evidence that it would ever work.
> That vast majority getting together and contractually agreeing to protect each other from those violent few would not be a case of coercion, but consensual agreement.
If you're proposing that that can be achieved without government, then you're wrong because there's a free-rider problem: https://zerocontradictions.net/civilization/case-against-libertarianism#voluntary-self-protection
> These things certainly can be done on a large scale.
No, they can't. Game theory proves otherwise.
> Elections are proof of this.
No, they aren't. Once again, elections exist within the context of a government that will punish people who reject the election results and want to overthrow the elected government. Elections also have the capacity to be rigged.
I don't generally advocate for a completely government free society, but I've been convinced that there are consensual structures that would likely work better than our current coercive structures for even things like national defense.
I generally advocate limited government - minarchy, with some structures to solve the largest free rider problems and resolving disputes.
Even in a government-less society, I do believe there need to be government-like structures that resolve free rider problems. For things where there are significant free rider affects in an area, one consensual solution is to have agreement to pay for defense a requirement to move into the defended area. This is government-like in that your choices are to pay for defense or to move somewhere else (and there may not be anywhere to move to without such a requirement). It may be feasible to resolve most of these free rider affects in a localized and decentralized way that allows practical choice, eg by doing this at the level of city or county, and then making confederate agreements among those cities or counties. I'm certainly willing to admit that large inland areas may still get substantial free rider benefits and refuse to pay for it. But it seems possible such free rider benefits might not be significant enough to warrant the force.
> I will suggest "Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction" by Ken Binmore.
I don't have time to spend hours reading the book recommendations of strangers, but I'm happy to discuss with you if you want to bring up points you think are most useful.
> No, they can't. Game theory proves otherwise.
How does game theory prove this? I do agree with you that free rider problems are significant. However, I think a flaw in much of your writing on libertarianism (based on what little of it I've read) is that it is a one sided attack that does not reference the desirability or efficacy of government solutions, but instead simply assumes their worth. I think its important to compare two alternatives, simply listing pros and cons of one alternative is not sufficient to make a choice unless put in reference to another alternative evaluated in the same way.
I agree that simple self-protection is clearly not an adequate defense. However, in a stateless society, you would not simply have voluntary armies, but you would have paid armies that are compensated based on their results, and so would have more incentive to follow through with their promises of defense.
However, there is of course the possibility that a war is lethal enough that no reasonable amount of money would persuade most people to fight. In such a case, as you suggest, a contractual agreement to fight if the need arises with contractual punishments for defectors might be necessary. David Friedman talks about that somewhere. There is a substantial difference between conscription, however, and a contractual obligation. One is entered into voluntarily and the other is not.
The problem with conscription over a voluntary contractual agreement is that its an easy way to exploit the populace. Rather than paying people an amount they would think is fair for the risk and work of having military obligations, they can pay people a much smaller amount and have worse conditions. There is no societal benefit to that. It would be more economically efficient to pay people an amount they find fair. During peace time, it seems far less likely that conscription would be a reasonable thing to have in comparison to fair compensation on a voluntary basis. But during wartime when the threat of death is imminent and not just theoretical, conscription seems much more likely to be appropriate.
I don't think its fair to characterize ancaps as generally saying polycentric law would "not fail". Its far more accurate to say they think it would likely succeed. There's a big difference there. One is an absolute and another is a tendency. There are few absolutes in this world.
I see you have a section on Georgism. Have you read my latest article on the land value tax?
You cover a lot of interesting topics in your write up on Libertarianism. I'll have to read more of it at some point.
> I think a flaw in much of your writing on libertarianism is that it is a one sided attack that does not reference the desirability or efficacy of government solutions, but instead simply assumes their worth.
The essay doesn't assume the value of government. The essay is about explaining why voluntary / consensual alternatives to government don't work. If consensual policies don't work, then government is necessary.
It's not one-sided either. I was an Ancap/Voluntaryist for almost 2 years, and a Libertarian for 4 years total. I use blockquote tags for addressing lots of pro-Libertarian objections throughout the essay, and there's even a section where I list what I do agree with Libertarians on: https://zerocontradictions.net/civilization/case-against-libertarianism#middle-ground
> How does game theory prove this?
The first essay that I linked explains this. From what you've written, it seems that you already implicitly understand why voluntary self-protection won't work when the circumstances are dire enough. You raise some good counter-arguments for less dire circumstances, and those will be addressed the next time the page is updated.
> Have you read my latest article on the land value tax?
Yes I have, and I'm glad we agree on that. My website also has multiple webpages about Georgism too:
- https://zerocontradictions.net/civilization/georgism-crash-course
- https://zerocontradictions.net/civilization/why-georgism-lost-popularity
- https://zerocontradictions.net/civilization/georgism-and-population-control
- https://zerocontradictions.net/FAQs/georgism-FAQs
What I mean is that its not framed as a comparison between government solutions and voluntary solutions. I would like to see those comparisons in such a write up.
I believe game theory proves that some government structures solve game theoretic problems. I don't see how it proves that there aren't other solutions to those problems. However, I do agree that any solution would require the ability to compel cooperation, but I believe that compulsion may be voluntarily agreed to in advance.
I came to one of the same conclusions about why Georgism lost popularity - the rise of the automobile made far more land accessible to people. This only lasted maybe 30 years however, before that land and the roads connecting them was used up. One reason I conjecture that you didn't mention is that WWII made the US massively wealthy and that lead to people forgetting the hard times (and Henry George). Since George was from the US, this probably helped kill the movement.
I don't see why I would write a comparison between government solutions and "voluntary" solutions. It's pretty straight-forward when one should be used instead of the other. "Voluntary" solutions work when there are no game-theoretic problems that must be solved, and government solutions are better when there are game-theoretic problems to be solved.
Perhaps I could elaborate more on my Middle Ground section where I talk about why I agree with Libertarians on some issues, but I feel that I've already written about my stance on those issues (or at least linked to people who talk about them) on my website.
From your perspective, I can see why you would favor having such a comparison, but I don't really care much about making everything "voluntary" when possible. I'm better described as a "whatever-works-ist" kind of person.
> I believe game theory proves that some government structures solve game theoretic problems. I don't see how it proves that there aren't other solutions to those problems.
If they are truly game-theoretic problems, then they would ultimately have to involve government intervention in some way. Most game theory problems (namely prisoner's dilemmas and tragedies of the commons) are distinguished by how they require force in order to be resolved. The exception is when government creates game-theoretic problems (e.g. welfare is a free-rider problem). But there are still free-rider problems that must be resolved by government force (e.g. protection, overpopulation, etc).
> WWII made the US massively wealthy and that lead to people forgetting the hard times (and Henry George). Since George was from the US, this probably helped kill the movement.
It's interesting that you bring that up. Perhaps I'll add that to the essay. I suppose a related reason could be how the cultural revolution during the 60s promoted many memes that aren't related to Georgism in any way. There's a limited number of memes that every person can promote since people have limited time and selective attention.